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Summary. Incomplete asset markets cause competitive equilibria to be con-
strained suboptimal and provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. In this
paper, we examine how intervention in prices in asset or spot commodity mar-
kets serves this purpose. We show that, if ﬁx-price equilibria behave sufﬁciently
regularly near Walrasian equilibria, Pareto improving price regulation is generi-
cally possible. An advantage of price regulation, contrasted with interventions in
individuals’asset portfolios, is that it operates anonymously, on market variables.
KeywordsandPhrases: Incompleteassetmarket,Fix-priceequilibria,Paretoim-
provement.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D45, D52, D60.
1 Introduction
When asset markets are incomplete, competitive equilibrium allocations generi-
cally fail to satisfy the criterion of constrained Pareto optimality which recognizes
the incompleteness of the asset market. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)
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showed that, generically, there exist reallocations of portfolios that yield Pareto






Hart (1975) gave an example of ﬁnancial innovation that leads to a Pareto deterio-
ration; Cass and Citanna (1998), Elul (1995) and Hara (1997) identiﬁed conditions
for Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovation.
Thetaxationoftradesinassets,whichisanonymous,cangenericallyimplement
aParetoimprovement.Citanna,PolemarchakisandTirelli(2001)demonstratedthe
result, which requires that the number of individuals not exceed the number of
traded assets; it provides only a partial answer to Kajii (1994), who pointed out
that, apart from informational requirements, the heterogeneity of individuals and
the requirement of anonymity may interfere with improving interventions.
The direct regulation of prices in spot commodity markets is an alternative to
the reallocation of portfolios or the taxation of trades in assets. Importantly, this is
not an intervention in individual choice variables but in market variables, and, as
such, it satisﬁes the requirement of anonymity.
An extension of the ﬁx-price equilibrium of Dr` eze (1975) provides a notion of
equilibrium that allows for trading at non-competitive prices; alternative speciﬁca-
tions, in Barro and Grossman (1971), B´ enassy (1975) orYoun` es (1975) should not
affect the argument.
The results of Laroque (1978, 1981), nevertheless, point out a stumbling block:
the behavior of ﬁx-price equilibria in the neighborhood of competitive equilibria is
particularly complicated. There are robust examples for which, at regulated prices
close to competitive prices, there are no ﬁx-price equilibria close to competitive
equilibria.Here,werestrictattentiontotheclassofeconomies,evidentlyrestrictive,
that satisfy conditions sufﬁcient for the local uniqueness of ﬁx-price equilibria. In
Herings and Polemarchakis (2003), a robust example illustrates the approach as
well as the results.
The conditions under which the result holds, that the number of instruments
(contingent commodities) exceed the number of objectives (individuals), imply
that the result complements the one of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and
Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2001).
Antecedents of this result are the argument in Polemarchakis (1979), where
ﬁxed wages that need not match shocks in productivity may yield higher expected
utility in spite of the loss of output in an economy of overlapping generations;
and the argument in Dr` eze and Gollier (1993), which employs the capital asset
pricingmodeltodetermineoptimalschedulesofwagesthatdifferfromthemarginal
productivity of labor. Kalmus (1997) gave a heuristic example of Pareto improving
price regulation.
Of serious concern are the informational requirements needed to determine,
even compute, improving interventions. In the case of price regulation they involve
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across states. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) and K¨ ubler, Chiappori, Eke-
land and Polemarchakis (2002) are only ﬁrst steps towards an analysis of the infor-
mational requirements of active policy.
2 The economy
The economy is that of the standard two-period general equilibrium model with
num´ eraire assets and incomplete asset markets. Assets exchange before and com-
modities after the state of the world realizes.
States of the world are s ∈S= {1,...,S} and commodities are l ∈L=
{1,...,L+1}.At state s,commodity (L+1,s) is num´ eraire.Assets are a ∈A=
{1,...,A+1 }.Asset A +1is num´ eraire. The payoffs of assets are denominated
in the num´ eraire commodity, (L +1 ,s), at every state of the world.
A bundle of commodities at a state of the world is xs =( ...,x l,s,...,
x(L+1),s); across states of the world, x =( ...,x s,...). A portfolio of assets
is y =( ..., ya, ..., yA+1).
The payoffs of an asset across states of the world are Ra· =( ...,R a,s,...) ;
at a state of the world, payoffs of assets are R·s =( ...,R a,s,...); across states
of the world, the asset payoff matrix is R =( ...,R a·,...).
The asset payoff matrix has full column rank, and the num´ eraire asset has
positive payoffs: RA+1· > 0.
Individuals are i ∈I= {1,...,I}. A utility function, ui, that satisﬁes stan-
dard conditions of continuity, monotonicity, quasi-concavity and, when required,
smoothness and boundary behavior, and the endowment, ei, a strictly positive bun-
dle,describeanindividual—theboundarybehavioroftheutilityfunction,together
with the strict positivity of the endowment guarantee that consumption bundles de-
mandedbytheindividuallieintheinterioroftheconsumptionset,asinseeDebreu
(1972).
The utility functions and consumption sets of individuals as well as the matrix
of asset payoffs do not vary. The allocation of endowments, ω =( ...,e i,...),
identiﬁes an economy, and the set of economies coincides with the strictly positive
orthant of the commodity space; a property holds generically if it holds for an open
set of economies of full Lebesgue measure.
Pricesofcommoditiesatastateoftheworldare(...,p l,s,...,1);acrossstates
of the world, p =( ...,p s,...)   0; the price of the num´ eraire commodity at a
state of the world is pL+1,s =1 ;the domain of prices of commodities is P. Prices
of assets are q =( ...,q a,...,1); The price of the num´ eraire asset is qA+1 =1 .
The domain of prices of assets is Q.
It is often convenient to truncate prices of commodities and prices of assets
by deleting the prices of the num´ eraires. Commodities or assets other than the
num´ eraire are ˇ L or ˇ A; the domain of prices of commodities or assets other than the
num´ eraires is ˇ P or ˇ Q.
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium, typically, does not exist.
In commodities and assets other than the num´ eraire, rationing on net trades, uni-
form across individuals, serves to attain market clearing. Rationing in the supply
(demand) of commodities other than the num´ eraire is z ≤ 0 (z ≥ 0). Rationing in138 P.J.J. Herings and H. Polemarchakis
the supply (demand) of assets other than the num´ eraire is y ≤ 0( y ≥ 0). With-
out appropriate rationing constraints, demand and supply of commodities will not
match,whichleadstoinconsistencies.Equilibriumrationingconstraintsareexactly
such that markets clear.








s) ≤ Rs·y, s ∈S ,
zl,s ≤ xl,s − ei
l,s ≤ zl,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
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his optimization problem is to choose a utility maximizing consumption bundle
and asset portfolio in his budget set. The set of all optimal consumption bundles
and asset portfolios is denoted di(p,q,z,z,y,y).
An individual is effectively rationed in his supply (demand) for a commod-
ity or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing constraint in the
supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is effective supply
(demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least one indi-
vidual is effectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity or asset.
At a competitive equilibrium, there is neither effective supply rationing nor effec-
tive demand rationing in the market for any commodity or asset. In this sense, a
competitive equilibrium is a special case of a ﬁx-price equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 (Fix-price equilibrium). A ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices
(p,q) is a pair ((x∗,y∗),(z∗,z∗,y∗,y∗)), such that
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4. for every a ∈ ˇ A, if for some i  yi
 ∗
a = y∗
a, then for all i ∈Iyi∗
a < y∗
a, while if
for some i  yi
 ∗
a = y∗
a, then for all i ∈Iyi∗
a >y ∗
a.
At a ﬁx-price equilibrium, only one side of the market is effectively rationed;
this is expressed by Conditions 3 and 4.
At prices (p,q), ﬁx-price equilibria exist.Appendix 1 spells out the arguments
in detail. Herings and Polemarchakis (2002) provide a (more complicated) proof
that requires weaker assumptions on the primitives.
A sign vector,
r =( r1,1,...,r L,S,r 1,...,r A),
describes the state of markets at a ﬁx-price equilibrium. If there is effective supply
rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset, the associated component of
the sign vector is -1, if there is effective demand rationing it is +1, and if there is
no effective rationing it is 0.
For a sign vector r, the set PQ(r) is the set of prices (p,q) ∈P×Q , for
which there exists a ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices (p,q) with state of the marketsPareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 139
r. For prices (p,q) ∈P×Q , the set of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations is D(p,q),
and, for a sign vector r, the set of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations with state of the
markets r is D(p,q,r).
A neighborhood of α is Nα.If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗))is a competitive equilibrium,
theallocation(x∗,y ∗)islocallyuniqueasaﬁx-priceequilibriumallocationifthere
exists a neighborhood N x∗,y∗ such that for every Nx∗,y∗ ⊂ N x∗,y∗ there exists a
neighborhood Np∗,q∗ with D(p,q)∩N x∗,y∗ a singleton for every (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗.
If a competitive equilibrium allocation is locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilib-
rium allocation, then, for prices close to competitive equilibrium prices, there is
exactly one ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation close to the competitive allocation.
For a locally unique competitive equilibrium allocation, for each sign vector r,
thefunction(  xr,   yr):N p∗,q∗∩PQ(r) → RI(L+1)S+I(A+1) associatestheunique
ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation in N x∗,y∗ ∩D(p,q,r) to (p,q).
Comparative statics require a differentiable form of local uniqueness.
Deﬁnition 2 (Differentiable local uniqueness). If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a com-
petitive equilibrium, the allocation (x∗,y∗) is differentiably locally unique as a
ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation if it is locally unique and there is a neighborhood
Np∗,q∗ such that, for every sign vector r, the function (  xr,   yr)|Np∗,q∗∩P Q (r) is
differentiable.
Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) proved, for a complete asset market, that,
generically, the set of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations can be represented by a
ﬁnite number of continuously differentiable functions of prices. Nevertheless, the
resultsinLaroque(1978)andtheexamplesinMadden(1982)showthatcompetitive
equilibria need not be locally unique as ﬁx-price equilibria. Even though ﬁx-price
equilibriumallocationsexistforallprices,theremayberobustlocalnon-existence,
andthereforelocalnon-uniquenessasaﬁx-priceequilibrium,atcompetitiveprices.
Assumption 1. For endowments in Ω∗, an open set of full Lebesgue measure, if
((p∗,q∗), (x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, then the competitive equilibrium
allocation is differentiably locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation.
By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque (1981),
Appendix 2 characterizes economies where competitive equilibrium allocation are
differentiably locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation.
Localuniquenessofﬁx-priceequilibriumallocationsatcompetitiveequilibriais
nottoostrongarequirement;itislessdemandingthantherequirementofuniqueness
of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood of competitive
prices. This guarantees a certain degree of generality of the results.
The function (  x,   y) associates the unique ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation in
Nx∗,y∗ to (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗.At a locally unique ﬁx-price equilibrium,
vi(p,q)=ui(  xi(p,q)), (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗
deﬁnes the indirect utility function of an individual. Lemma 2 in Appendix 2 im-
plies that it is differentiable when the ﬁx-price equilibrium is differentiably locally
unique, with partial derivatives given by
∂pl,svi(p∗,q∗)=−∂xL+1,sui(xi∗)(xi∗
l,s − ei
l,s), (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S.140 P.J.J. Herings and H. Polemarchakis
Theeffectofachangeinthespotmarketpriceofcommodity(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×Sisequal
to minus the marginal utility of the num´ eraire commodity in state s multiplied by
the excess demand of commodity (l,s) at the competitive equilibrium. Lemma 2
in Appendix 2 therefore implies that the indirect welfare effects of a change in
prices,generatedbytheinducedchangeintherationingconstraintsandindividuals’
choices, equal zero.
Pareto improving price regulation
If the asset market is incomplete, A+1<S ,generically, competitive equilibrium
allocations are not Pareto optimal.
Price regulation can Pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q ∗),
(x∗,y∗)) if there exist prices of commodities p such that a ﬁx-price equilibrium
of commodities at prices of commodities and assets (p,q∗) Pareto dominates the
allocation x∗. The ambiguity introduced by the possibility of multiple ﬁx-price
equilibrium allocations at prices (p,q∗) is circumvented by considering local vari-
ations at competitive equilibrium allocations that are differentiably locally unique
as ﬁx-price equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3 (Pareto improving price regulation). Price regulation can Pareto
improve upon a competitive equilibrium, ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)), that is locally unique
as a ﬁx-price equilibrium if there exists dˇ p ∈ RLS such that
 
(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S
∂pl,svi(p∗,q∗)dpl,s > 0, for every i ∈I .
Uniform price regulation can improve upon a competitive equilibrium if
dˇ ps = dˇ ps , for all s,s  ∈S .
If(uniform)priceregulationcanimproveuponacompetitiveequilibrium,there
is ε>0 such that for all ε ∈ (0,ε], the ﬁx-price equilibrium in the neighborhood
of the competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) at commodity prices ˇ p∗ + εdˇ p
and asset prices q∗ Pareto dominates the competitive equilibrium. Uniform price
regulations are of interest because they imply a state-independent change in prices.
It shows that relatively simple policies sufﬁce for the realization of a Pareto im-
provement 1.
Generically, it is possible to make every individual better off by choosing ap-
propriate price regulations on the spot markets when asset markets are incomplete.
One needs at least as many instruments, LS, as individuals, I.
Uniform price regulation is effective when L ≥ I,which reﬂects again that the
number of instruments has to exceed the number of objectives. This complements
the constrained suboptimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
which applies when 2L ≤ I ≤ L(S − 1 )+1 .
Proposition 1. Suppose that
1 John Geanakoplos and Hamid Sabourian insisted on this point.Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 141
1. For every individual, the consumption set is X i = {x : x ≥ 0}; the utility
function is continuous and quasi - concave; in the interior of the consumption
set,2 Int X i, it is twice continuously differentiable, ∂ui   0 and ∂2ui is
negative deﬁnite on3 (∂ui)⊥; the endowment is strictly positive: ei ∈ Int X i,
and ui(ei) >u i(x), for every x ∈ Bd X i.
2. The matrix of payoffs of assets has full column rank. The numeraire asset, has
positive payoff: rA+1 > 0.
If Assumption 1 holds, the asset market is incomplete (A +1 <S ), and
LS ≥ I>1, then, generically, price regulation can improve upon any competitive
equilibrium.
If L ≥ I>1, then, generically, uniform price regulation can improve upon
any competitive equilibrium.
Appendix 3 gives the proof, which follows Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998).
In the paper we focus on the adjustment of prices of state-contingent commodi-
ties, rather than asset prices. One reason for this is that government interventions in
commoditypricesseemtooccurmuchmorefrequentlythangovernmentcontrolof
assetprices.Fromapurelynormativepointofview,thecasewherethecentralplan-
ner is limited to adjustments of asset prices only, with competitive spot commodity
markets in future periods, is interesting as well. It provides an anonymous alter-




asset prices at q∗, which allows us to derive a simple expression for the derivative
with respect to spot commodity prices of the indirect utility function in Lemma 2.
The corresponding expression for an indirect utility function where asset prices
adjust to clear the asset markets is more complicated, and the question whether
Pareto improving price regulation is possible in that sense is open.
Appendix 1: existence of ﬁx-price equilibria
A compact, convex subset of the consumption set that contains the aggregate initial
endowment in its interior is   X i The assumptions on utility functions and on the
asset return matrix imply that all S +1budget inequalities in the deﬁnition of the
budget set hold with equality at the optimal choice of an individual. The rationing
inequalitiesdonotnecessarilyholdwithequality.Thebudgetsetrelatedto   X i with
all budget inequalities required to hold with equality is   βi and the corresponding
demandfunction   di.Sincepricesareﬁxedat(p,q),theyareomittedinthenotation.
The demand functions   di,i∈I , are continuous.
2 “Int” denotes the interior of a set and “Bd” the boundary.
3 “⊥” denotes the orthogonal complement.142 P.J.J. Herings and H. Polemarchakis
If (zn,zn,y
n,yn) is a sequence that converges to (z,z,y,y), then the se-
quence (  di(zn,zn,y
n, yn)) has a convergent subsequence, with limit (  x,   y) ∈
  βi(z,z,y,y).
If there exists (  x,   y) ∈   βi(z,z,y,y), such that ui(  x) >u i(  x), and   L−,   L+,
  A−, and   A+, is the sets of non-num´ eraire commodities and non-num´ eraire assets
for which   xl,s −ei








  xl,s − ei
l,s
,(l,s) ∈   L−,
zn
l,s
  xl,s − ei
l,s








,a∈   A+
 
,
  xn = ei + λn(  x − ei), and   yn = λn  y, (  xn,   yn) ∈   βi(zn,zn,yn,yn). Evidently,
limn→∞ λn =1 , and limn→∞(  xn,   yn)=(   x,   y). By the continuity of ui,   xn is










l,s +ε, with ε some ﬁxed positive number. Since R has full column
rank, this implies that there is α>0 such that  y∗i ∞ <αfor any y∗i consistent
with a ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices (p,q).
The functions (z,z):CLS →− RLS
+ × RLS
+ and (y,y):CA →− RA
+ × RA
+,





























(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
y
a(ρ)= −min{2ρaα,α},a ∈ ˇ A,
ya(ρ) = min{(2 − 2ρa)α,α},a ∈ ˇ A.
The excess demand function   z : CLS ×C A → RLS × RA is
  zl,s(r,ρ)=
 I




l,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S
  za(r,ρ)=
 I
i=1   di
a(z(r),z(r),y(ρ),y(ρ)),a ∈ ˇ A.Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 143
If (r∗,ρ ∗) ∈C LS ×C A is such that   z(r∗,ρ ∗)=0 , then ((x∗,y∗),(z∗,z∗,y∗,
y∗)), where (x∗i,y∗i)=  di(z∗,z∗,y∗,y∗),i∈I , (z∗,z∗)=( z(r∗),z(r∗)), (y∗,
y∗)=( y(r∗),y(r∗)), is a ﬁx-price equilibrium. Conditions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 1
are satisﬁed for non-numeraire commodities and assets. The construction of the
functions (z,z) and (y,y) takes care of Conditions 3 and 4.
The set   z(CLS ×CA) is compact. Let the set ZY be a compact, convex set that















The correspondence ϕ : ZY ×CLS ×C A →Z Y×C LS ×C A is deﬁned by
ϕ(z,y,r,ρ)={  z(r,ρ)}×µ(z,y). It is a non-empty, compact, convex valued,
upper hemi-continuous correspondence deﬁned on a non-empty, compact, convex
set. By Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, ϕ has a ﬁxed point, (z∗,y∗,r∗,ρ ∗).
If, for some a ∈ ˇ A,y ∗
a < 0, then, by the deﬁnition of µ, ρ∗
a =0 , so y∗
a ≥ 0,
a contradiction. If, for some a ∈ ˇ A,y ∗
a > 0, then, by the deﬁnition of µ, ρ∗
a =1 ,
so y∗
a ≤ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, y∗




a∈ ˇ A qay∗
a =0 .
If, for some (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,z ∗
l,s < 0, then, by the deﬁnition of µ, r∗
l,s =0 , so
z∗
l,s ≥ 0,acontradiction.If,forsome(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,z∗
l,s > 0,then,bythedeﬁnition
of µ, r∗
l,s =1 , so z∗
l,s ≤ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, z∗
l,s =0 , for all (l,s) ∈
ˇ L×S. Moreover, for every s ∈S ,z ∗
L+1,s = −
 
(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S pl,sz∗
l,s + Rs·y∗ =0 .
It follows that 0 ∈   z(r∗,ρ ∗), so a ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices (p,q) exists.
Appendix 2: local comparative statics
In the optimization problem an individual faces when determining his demand,
the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints in the markets
for commodities (assets) are π (ρ). The individual optimization problem leads to
the study of a modiﬁed demand function,   di. At prices and Lagrange multipliers
(p,q,π,ρ),   di is deﬁned by the solution to the optimization problem
max ui(x) −
 
(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S πl,sxl,s −
 
a∈ ˇ A ρaya,
s.t. qy ≤ 0,
ps(xs − ei
s) ≤ Rs·y, s ∈S .
Thesetof(p,q,π,ρ)onwhicheachindividualoptimizationproblemhasasolution
is N. Whenever (p∗,q∗) are competitive equilibrium prices, N is a neighborhood
of (p∗,q∗,0,0).















l,s = maxi∈I xi∗
l,s − ei
l,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
y−
a = mini∈I yi∗
a ,y +
a = maxi∈I yi∗
a ,a ∈ ˇ A,

































,a ∈ ˇ A,
then, in a neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium, only individuals in Il,s
(Il,s) may be rationed on supply (demand) in the spot market (l,s), and only
individuals in Ia (Ia) on supply (demand) in the asset market a.
For an open set of endowments with full Lebesgue measure Ω ⊂ R
I(L+1)S
++ ,
for any competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) of E, |I l,s |=| Il,s |=1 ,
(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and |I a |=| Ia |=1 ,a∈ ˇ A.
For a generic set of economies, there is exactly one individual in each market
with the minimal excess demand and exactly one individual with the maximal
excess demand. For the remainder, the allocation of endowments in the economy E
belongtothesetΩ,whichpermitsthestudyofthelocalstructureofthesetﬁx-price
equilibria in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) of
E.




    
    
πl,s, if πl,s ≤ 0 and {i} = Il,s





    
    
ρa, if ρa ≤ 0 and {i} = Ia
or ρa ≥ 0 and {i} = Ia,
0, otherwise.
The function c associates with Lagrange multipliers, (π,ρ), ﬁx-price equilibria in
the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium. The aggregate modiﬁed excessPareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 145




i∈I   di
l,s(p,q,ci(π,ρ)) −
 
i∈I ei, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
  za(p,q,π,ρ)=
 
i∈I   di
a(p,q,ci(π,ρ)),a ∈ ˇ A.
For the study of ﬁx-price equilibria in the neighborhood of the competitive equi-
librium, it is sufﬁcient to restrict attention to the zero points of   z. Neighbor-
hoods N i
xi∗,yi∗ are such that, for every (x,y) ∈N x∗,y∗ = ×i∈IN i
xi∗,yi∗, for






















l,s,i = i ,i   ∈ Il,s
yi
 
a < 0 and yi
 
a <y i
a,i  = i ,i   ∈I a
yi
 
a > 0 and yi
 
a >y i
a,i  = i ,i   ∈ Ia.
If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, and (x,y) ∈N x∗,y∗, then
(x,y) ∈D (p,q) if and only if there is (p,q,π,ρ) ∈Nsuch that   di(p,q,ci(π,ρ))
=( xi,yi),i∈I , and   z(p,q,π,ρ)=( 0 ,0).
The function   z is Lipschitz continuous because of the differentiability of the
functions   di and the Lipschitz continuity of the functions ci. It is differentiable at
each (p,q,π,ρ) ∈Nwhere all components of π and ρ are non-zero. For each sign
vector r without zero components,
N r =
 
(p,q,π,ρ) ∈N: πl,srl,s > 0,(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,ρ ara > 0,a∈ ˇ A
 
.
The function   z is differentiable on N r. The limit of its Jacobian, limn→∞ ∂  z
(pn,qn,πn,ρ n)=∂  zr(p∗,q∗,0,0), along a sequence ((pn,qn,πn,ρ n) ∈N r)
that converges to (p∗,q∗,0, 0), exists;
∂ˇ p,ˇ q  zr
l,s(p∗,q∗,0,0) =
 
i∈I ∂ˇ p,ˇ q   di
l,s(p∗,q∗,0,0) = ∂ˇ p,ˇ qzl,s(p∗,q∗),
∂ˇ p,ˇ q  zr
a(p∗,q∗,0,0) =
 
i∈I ∂ˇ p,ˇ q   di
a(p∗,q∗,0,0) = ∂ˇ p,ˇ qza(p∗,q∗),
where z(p,q) denotes the unconstrained total excess demand function for com-
modities and assets other than the numeraires at prices (p,q). It follows that the
Jacobian with respect to (ˇ p, ˇ q) is independent of r at a competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, such that ∂z (p∗,
q∗)isoffullrank,then,foreachsignvectorr withoutzerocomponents,thetangent
cone at (p∗,q∗) to the set of price systems having a local ﬁx-price equilibrium with
state of the markets r is
 
(p,q) ∈P×Q:(ˇ p, ˇ q)=( ∂z(p∗,q∗))−1∂π,ρ  zr(p∗,q∗,0,0)(π,ρ),
πl,srl,s > 0,(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,ρ ara > 0,a∈ ˇ A
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Proof. The restriction of   z to N r extends to a differentiable function   z : N→
RLS+A as follows. For i ∈I , the function   ci is deﬁned by   ci
l,s(π,ρ)=πl,s
if i ∈I l,s,r l,s = −1, or i ∈ Il,s,r l,s =+ 1 ,   ci
l,s(π,ρ)=0otherwise, and
  ci
a(π,ρ)=ρa if i ∈I a,r a = −1, or i ∈ Ia,r a =+ 1 , and   ci
a(π,ρ)=0
otherwise. The function   z is deﬁned as   z with c replaced by   c. Since ∂z(p∗,q∗)
is of full rank, it follows by the implicit function theorem that the solution to
  z(p,q,π,ρ)=( 0 ,0) determines p and q as a function of π and ρ in a neighborhood
of (0,0). The derivative of this function at (0,0) with respect to π and ρ is given
by (∂z(p∗,q∗))−1∂π,ρ  z(p∗,q∗,0,0). The expression in the proposition follows
immediately if one takes into account that only π’s and ρ’s satisfying πl,srl,s > 0,
(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and ρara > 0,a∈ ˇ A, should be considered.    
Proposition2inGeanakoplosandPolemarchakis(1986)showsthattheassump-
tionthat∂z(p∗,q∗)hasfullrankateverycompetitiveequilibriumholdsgenerically
in endowments. Lemma 3.2 characterizes the tangent cones to the regions in the
price space having a ﬁx-price equilibrium with state of the markets r in the neigh-
borhoodofacompetitiveequilibrium.Itguaranteesneitherthattheclosuresofthese
tangent cones cover the price space nor that the tangent cones are full-dimensional
nor that the tangent cones do not intersect. If this were the case, local uniqueness
would result.
In general, an increase in a price causes a different individual to be rationed
as a decrease in a price. Since ∂π,ρ  zr, and therefore the tangent cone, depend on
∂π,ρ  di fortheindividualithatisrationed,thefactthatthetangentconesneednotﬁt
nicely together does not come as a surprise. In abstract terms, the fact that different
individuals get rationed at different prices in the neighborhood of a competitive
equilibrium, creates non-differentiabilities in the function   z at competitive prices.
At a point of non-differentiability, the implicit function theorem need not apply,
and local uniqueness may fail.
The generalized Jacobian of a Lipschitz continuous function f at a point x is
the convex hull of all matrices that are the limits of the sequence (∂f(xn)), where
(xn) is a convergent sequence with limn→∞ xn = x and f is differentiable at xn.
A restriction of the fundamentals of the economy, the utility functions of indi-
viduals and the matrix of asset payoffs is required to guarantee that, generically,
competitive equilibrium allocations are differentiably locally unique as ﬁx-price
equilibrium allocations
If a function f is Lipschitz continuous, f(  x,   y)=0 , and every matrix M in
∂xf(  x,   y) has full rank, then there exist a neighborhood N x, y, a neighborhood
N y, and a Lipschitz continuous function g on N y such that (x,y) ∈N  x, y and
f(x,y)=0if and only if y ∈N  y and x = g(y).
Assumption 2. For endowments in Ω∗, an open set of full Lebesgue measure,
if ((p∗,q∗), (x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, then the determinants of the
matrices ∂π,ρ  zr(p∗,q∗,0,0), with r sign vectors without zero components, are
either all equal to −1 or all equal to +1.Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 147
By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque (1981),
thecompetitiveequilibriumallocationisdifferentiablylocallyuniqueasaﬁx-price
equilibrium allocation.
Remark. An example of an economy that satisﬁes differentiable local uniqu- eness
for all endowments and, ` a fortiori, satisﬁesAssumption 2.
There are three states of the world, two commodities and two assets.The utility





s(xs)=αi lnx1,s +( 1− αi)x2,s, 0 <α i < 1,
and a uniform probability measure π over the states of the world. The payoffs of
the assets are R·1 =( 1 ,0,0) , and R·2 =( 0 ,1,0) . Endowments are chosen such
that |I l,s |=| Il,s |=1 , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and |I a |=| Ia |=1 ,a∈ ˇ A, so they
belong to a set of full Lebesgue measure by Lemma 4.4.
Competitiveequilibriumpricesare(p∗,q∗).Allpartialderivativesareevaluated
at (p∗,q∗,0,0). It holds that ∂π1,s  zr = ∂π1,s   di(1,s), where {i(1,s)} = I1,s if
r1,s = −1, and {i(1,s)} = I1,s if r1,s =+ 1 . An increase in π1,s corresponds to






individual i(1) is the one affected by rationing in the asset market, so {i(1)} = I1
if r1 = −1, and {i(1)} = I1 if r1 =+ 1 . From the properties of the Cobb-Douglas
utility function, it follows that
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1,3 =0 .
The sign of the determinant of ∂π,ρ  zr does not change by premultiplying it by















































































Thedeterminantof∂π,ρ  zr ispositive,irrespectiveofthesignvectorr.Itfollowsthat
thecompetitiveequilibriumallocationisdifferentiablylocallyuniqueasaﬁx-price
equilibrium allocation.    
As in Laroque (1981), whenever there are two sign vectors without zero com-
ponents r1 and r2 such that the determinants of ∂π,ρ  zr
1
(p∗,q∗,0,0) and ∂π,ρ  zr
2
(p∗, q∗, 0, 0) have opposite signs and ∂z(p∗,q∗) has full rank, then for every
neighborhood Nx∗,y∗ there exists for every neighborhood Np∗,q∗ a price system
(p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗ with at least two ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations in Nx∗,y∗. As-




of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood of competitive
prices.Thelatterrequirementguaranteesacertaindegreeofgeneralityofourresults.
The function (  x,   y):Np∗,q∗ → RI(L+1)S+I(A+1) associates the unique ﬁx-
price equilibrium allocation in Nx∗,y∗ to (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗.The indirect utility func-




, (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗.
Lemma 2. If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, then the indirect







, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S.
Proof. For every sign vector r, the restriction of vi to Np∗,q∗ ∩PQ (r), denoted
vi
r







s (p,q) − ei
s
 
= Rs·  yi
r
(p,q),s ∈S ,




























Since the derivative is independent of the sign vector r, the result follows.    
Appendix 3: Pareto improving price regulation
Price regulation can Pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗), (x∗,
y∗)) if there exist prices of commodities p such that a ﬁx-price equilibrium of com-
moditiesatpricesofcommoditiesandassets(p,q∗)Paretodominatestheallocation
x∗. The ambiguity introduced by the possibility of multiple ﬁx-price equilibrium
allocationsatprices(p,q∗)iscircumventedbyconsideringlocalvariationsatcom-
petitive equilibrium allocations that are differentiably locally unique as ﬁx-price
equilibria.
Pareto improvement by price regulation is possible only if the asset market is
incomplete.Another necessary requirement is that the economy allows for hetero-
geneous individuals.
Assumption 3. A +1<Sand I>1.
The function ϕ is deﬁned by














−   λi  p, i ∈I
 














, (l,s) ∈L×S\{ (L +1 ,S)}
 



















where the Lagrangian multiplier   λi ∈ R does not vary with the state of the world,
the prices of commodities   p ∈ R
(L+1)S−1
++ ×{ 1} are discounted prices, with only
the price of commodity (L +1 ,S) normalized to 1, and n  =0i saﬁ x e dv e c -
tor such that nR =0 . In the standard reformulation of the incomplete markets
model in discounted prices, it is assumed that one individual is unconstrained, so
that his marginal utility at an optimal choice is proportional to the price system.
Pareto optimality implies that the marginal utility vectors of all agents should be
proportional to the price system.The function ϕ is completed by specifying budget
constraints and market clearing conditions, and one condition for every individual
but one that recognizes the incompleteness of markets:
 
s∈S ns  ps(xi
s − ei
s)=0 .
The existence of n  =0such that nR =0follows from market incompleteness. It
follows that the function ϕ vanishes at a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium.150 P.J.J. Herings and H. Polemarchakis
For a function f that depends on a vector of variables α and on endowments
e, fe(α) is the function that results from ﬁxing e; for instance, ϕe(x,  λ,   p)=
ϕ(x,  λ,   p,e).
Lemma 3. Generically, competitive equilibrium allocations are not Pareto opti-
mal.
Proof. A necessary condition for x to be a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium
allocation for an economy e is that ϕe(x,  λ,   p)=0 . Since the dimension of the
domain of ϕe is lower than the dimension of the range, whenever ϕe is transverse
to 0, a solution to ϕe(x,  λ,   p)=0does not exist. By a standard argument, ϕ is
transverse to 0. By the transversal density theorem, the set of economies for which
ϕe is transverse to 0 has full Lebesgue measure. By a standard argument, this set
can be chosen to be open.    

























s) − Rs·yi,i ∈I ,s∈S




l,s), (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S
 
i∈I yi





















ξ =( x,λ,y,µ, ˇ p, ˇ q) and Ξ = R
I(L+1)S
++ × RIS
++ × RI(A+1) × RI × ˇ P × ˇ Q. The
dimension of Ξ is N. When ξ∗ is consistent with a competitive equilibrium, it is
necessarily the case that ψe(ξ∗)=0 .













A competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by price regulation if the matrix
of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to prices has full
rank4. By Proposition 4.8, this matrix is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no
solution to ψe(ξ)=0in combination with he(ξ,α)=0 .







4 If the matrix of partial derivatives has full rank, it is possible to generate any desired marginal
change in utilities by means of price regulation.Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 151
If   ψ is transverse to 0, then it follows from the transversal density theorem that for
asubsetofendowmentsoffullLebesguemeasure,   ψe istransverseto0.IfLS ≥ I,
then the dimension of the range of   ψe exceeds that of the domain. Transversality
of   ψe implies that there are no solutions to the associated system of equations. It is
possible to Pareto improve all competitive equilibria by price regulation.
Proposition 1. If LS ≥ I, then, generically, all competitive equilibria of E can
be Pareto improved by price regulation.
Proof. One ﬁxes (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×Sand Ω∗∗, an open subset of endowments in Ω∗
of full Lebesgue measure, such that no competitive equilibrium of the associated





















If   ψ(ξ,e)=0 , then the matrix   M of partial derivatives of   ψ evaluated at (ξ,e) has
full row rank: if v   M =0 , then v =0 . The components of v are v1,i,l,s,i∈I ,
(l,s) ∈L×S,v 2,i,s,i∈I ,s∈S ,v 3,i,a,i∈I ,a∈A ,v 4,l,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
v5,a,a∈ ˇ A,v 6,i,i∈I ,andv9,accordingtothelabellingoftheequationsdeﬁning
  ψ.
If v is such that v   M =0 , then 0=v ∂ei
L+1,s
  ψ(ξ,e)=−v2,i,s,i∈I ,s∈S .
It follows that, for i ∈I ,
0=v ∂ei
l,s
  ψ(ξ,e)=−v4,l,s, (l,s) ∈ ( ˇ L\{ l}) ×S,
0=v ∂ei
l,s










Consequently, if v4,l, s =0for some   s ∈S\{ s}, then v9 =0and v4,l,s =0 , for














,i , i   ∈I ,s∈S\{ s}.



















s2.The economy e has then a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium
induced by ξ, contradicting e ∈ Ω∗∗. Consequently, v4,l,s =0 ,s∈S\{ s}, and
v9 =0 .
For i ∈I , and (l,s) ∈L×S,
0=v ∂xi
l,s
  ψ(ξ,e)=v 
1,i,·,·∂xi
l,s∂ui(xi).152 P.J.J. Herings and H. Polemarchakis
It is possible to represent a utility function satisfying A2 by one with ∂2ui(xi)
negative deﬁnite on a bounded subset of the consumption set. Then it follows that
v1,i,·,· =0 . For i ∈I , 0=v ∂yi
A+1
  ψ(ξ,e)=v8,i. Also, for a ∈ ˇ A, 0=
v ∂yi
a
  ψ(ξ,e)=v5,a. Finally, 0=v ∂λi
s
  ψ(ξ,e)=v 
3,i,·R 
s·,i∈I ,s∈S . Since R
has full column rank it follows that v3,i,a =0 ,i∈I ,a∈A .
Therefore,v =0 ,   M hasfullrowrankN+1,and   ψ istransverseto0.Thesetof
endowments such that   ψe is transverse to zero is denoted   Ωl,s. By the transversal
density proposition, Ω∗∗ \   Ωl,s has Lebesgue measure zero. For e ∈   Ωl,s, the





The set   Ω = ∩(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S   Ωl,s is of full Lebesgue measure and, by a standard
argument, open. Redeﬁne the function   ψ such that endowments belong to Ω∗ ∩   Ω.
For (ξ,α,e) such that   ψ(ξ,α,e)=0 ,   M is the matrix of partial derivatives of   ψ
evaluated at (ξ,α,e).
Ifv issuchthatv   M =0 ,andthecomponentsofv aredenotedbyv1,i,l,s,v 2,i,s,
v3,i,a,v 4,l,s,v 5,a,v 6,i,v 7,l,s, and v8, then, 0=v ∂ei
L+1,s
  ψ(ξ,α,e)=−v2,i,s,
i ∈I ,s∈S . Hence,
0=v ∂ei
l,s
  ψ(ξ,α,e)=−v4,l,s − αiλi
sv7,l,s,i ∈I , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S.
Since
 
i∈I(αi)2 =1 , there is i  such that αi
 
 =0 . If there is s ∈Ssuch that, for






























































s  =0 .





s)v7,l,s =0 , so v7,l,s =0 , and, thus v4,l,s =0 .
Also, 0=v ∂αi    ψ(ξ,α,e)=2 αi
 
v8, so, since αi
 
 =0 ,v 8 =0 . It follows as in
the ﬁrst part of the proof that v1,i,l,s =0 ,i∈I , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, that v6,i =0 ,
i ∈I , that v5,a =0 ,a∈ ˇ A, and that v3,i,a =0 ,i∈I ,a∈A .
Therefore,   M has rank N + LS +1and   ψ intersects 0 transversally. If   Ω is
the set of economies such that   ψe is transverse to 0, then Ω∗ \   Ω has Lebesgue
measure zero by the transversal density theorem. Openness follows by a standard
argument.    
Generically, it is possible to make every individual better off by choosing ap-
propriate price regulations on the spot markets when asset markets are incom-
plete. One needs at least as many instruments, LS, as individuals, I.Proposition 1
makes clear that this is all one needs. This is not the case in the constrained sub-
optimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), which applies when
2L ≤ I ≤ L(S − 1 )+1 .Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete 153
A competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by uniform price regulation
if the matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to
uniform price regulation has full rank.










The matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to
uniform price regulation is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no solution to
ψe(ξ)=0in combination with ke(ξ,α)=0 .
Corollary 1. If L ≥ I, then, generically, all competitive equilibria of E can be
Pareto improved by uniform price regulation.
Proof. The argument follows that in the proof of Proposition 5.3. The equations
related to h that characterize Pareto improving price regulation are replaced by
the equations related to k that characterize Pareto improvements by uniform price
regulation. This deﬁnes a function ψ.The matrix M gives the partial derivatives of
ψ evaluated at some (ξ,α,e) with ψ(ξ,α,e)=0 . If v M =0 , by considering the
partial derivatives with respect to ei
l,s, it follows that v2,i,s =0 ,i∈I ,s∈S , and
v4,l,s +αiλi
sv7,l =0 ,i∈I , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S. If i  is such that αi
 
 =0 , and if s ∈S





s =0 , then
0=
 













































l,s),l ∈ ˇ L,
which contradicts e ∈   Ω. It follows that v4,l,s =0 , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and v7,l =0 ,
l ∈ ˇ L.TheremainderoftheprooffollowstheargumentintheproofofProposition6.
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